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A Primer on Demand Response and a Critique of FERC Order 745
Richard J. Pierce, Jr. 1
The debate about demand response in electricity markets has become far more
complicated than it needs to be. The basic economic and legal concepts implicated by the
debate are simple. They are, or should be, much easier to understand than the tens of
thousands of pages of contentious testimony and comments submitted in Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) and state public utility commission (PUC) demand
response proceedings suggest. My goal is to describe the applicable economic and legal
principles in a manner that will make the debate broadly accessible to market
participants, policy makers, and the general public.
A. The Economics of Demand Response
The price of any good or service sold in a competitive market is determined by
the intersection of the supply and demand curves. 2 The supply curve is determined by the
marginal cost (MC) of the good or service. 3 MC is the cost of the last unit of the good or
service produced. 4 For purposes of understanding the demand response debate, it may be
easiest to think of MC with reference to an alternative but functionally identical
definition. MC is the cost society saves by declining to produce the last unit of the good
or service. 5
In a competitive market, we can rely on market forces alone to yield an
appropriate demand response to changes in conditions of supply or demand. 6 If the MC-
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based price a customer confronts exceeds the value the customer places on the last unit
the customer purchases, the customer will decline to purchase that unit. If we have taken
the steps needed to equate marginal social cost (MSC) with marginal private cost (MPC),
each customer’s decision to purchase or not to purchase a unit maximizes social welfare,
since each customer is basing its purchase decisions on its application of a social costbenefit test that it is uniquely well-equipped to apply. 7
For present purposes, I will assume that the MSC of making a unit of electricity
available on a wholesale or retail market equals the MPC of that process. I will relax that
assumption in section D. On that assumption, the customer receives the socially-optimal
“reward” for declining to purchase any unit with a benefit that falls short of its MC-based
price—a reward equal to the cost society avoids as a result of the customer’s decision not
to purchase a unit that it values less than the MC-based price of the unit. This is why we
do not need to devise a system to “reward” customers for engaging in demand response
in most markets. The savings the customer realizes as a result of its decision not to
purchase a unit of a good or service is a “reward” for conservation that is precisely equal
to the social value of that decision to conserve.
Many electricity markets do not replicate the performance of competitive markets,
however, for two reasons. First, some of the functions that must be performed to deliver
electricity to customers—mainly transmission and distribution—involve economies of
scale so large that the owners of the assets that perform those functions have monopoly
power. 8 When a producer has monopoly power, the prices it charges exceed MC. 9 In the
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absence of government intervention of some type, that effect of monopoly power would,
inter alia, reduce social value by inducing consumers to engage in too much conservation.
The existence of monopoly power both eliminates the natural tendency of a
competitive market to induce optimal conservation and justifies government regulation.
The US has long regulated both the wholesale and retail price of electricity. The
existence of price regulation is the second reason why we can not be confident that
electricity markets alone will yield optimal demand response. The methods we use to
regulate the price of electricity often yield prices that diverge significantly from MC. 10 In
some important contexts, regulated prices fall well short of MC. That creates a situation
in which consumers have incentives to conserve too little in the absence of some other
form of government intervention that offsets that incentive effect—e.g., an explicit
“reward” for conservation in addition to the market-based “reward” the consumer gets as
a result of a decision to decline to purchase a unit of electricity.
The divergence between MC-based prices and regulated prices, and the resulting
failure to provide adequate incentives for demand response, can have serious adverse
effects. The best single illustration of the potential adverse effects of that divergence is
the California energy debacle of 2000. 11 During the spring of 2000, California
experienced periodic blackouts and a 500 per cent increase in the wholesale price of
electricity. 12 Those catastrophic events would not have occurred if government officials
in California had taken account of the critical role of demand response in an electricity
market. Instead, the California legislature imposed a freeze on the retail price of
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electricity. 13 A price freeze eliminates all potential demand responses to a change in
market conditions. When the supply of electricity in the wholesale market that is the
source of the electricity that is sold in the California retail market declined, the price in
the wholesale market increased, but the freeze on the retail price precluded retailers from
passing that increase through to consumers. As a result, consumers had no incentive to
reduce their purchases.
Without the retail price freeze, California consumers would have experienced the
price increases that normally flow from a reduction in available supply and would have
reduced their consumption accordingly. That, in turn, would have produced a new
equilibrium in the wholesale market. The wholesale market would have cleared at a price
somewhat higher than the price that existed before the reduction in the supply available in
the wholesale market but the existence of demand response to the price increase would
have served as a natural brake on the rate of increase in the retail price. In the absence of
demand response to the changes in conditions in the wholesale market, the price in that
market continued to spiral out of control. 14 Blackouts were the inevitable result of that
failure to allow a demand response in the retail market to the increases in the price in the
wholesale market.
The California debacle illustrates an important point that Louis Kaplow has made
in some of his recent contributions to the antitrust literature. Market share alone can tell
us nothing about whether a firm has market power, i.e., the power to increase market
price by reducing the amount of a good or service it supplies. 15 If the demand for a
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product or service is completely price elastic, even a firm with 100% of the market has no
market power. 16 Conversely, if the demand for a product or service is completely price
inelastic, even a firm with only 1 per cent of the market can exercise market power. 17 The
retail price freeze imposed by the California legislature created a market with completely
price inelastic demand. A market with no potential demand response always performs
poorly. 18 The likely effects of failure to provide any incentive to reduce retail demand in
response to an increase in wholesale price include price spikes, shortages, and extreme
vulnerability to market manipulation by suppliers in the wholesale market.
The California debacle also illustrates another important point. Both wholesale
markets and retail markets should be designed to provide appropriate incentives for
demand response. The failure to provide incentives for any demand response in the
California retail electricity market had catastrophic results for the wholesale electricity
market that serves California. It is easy to illustrate the converse of that phenomenon by
reference to the natural gas market during the 1970s. Below-market ceilings on the price
of natural gas at the wellhead (the wholesale market) eliminated incentives for purchasers
to reduce their demand in response to increased prices. That, in turn, produced a variety
of market distortions and attendant social costs that have been documented in the
literature, e.g., prices far above market price for supplies that were not subject to
wholesale price ceilings and shortages in retail gas markets that forced the closure of
many factories and the layoff of millions of workers. 19 Thus, it is clear that failure to
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provide appropriate incentives for demand responses to changes in market conditions in a
wholesale market can have severe adverse effects on any retail market served by that
wholesale market, while failure to provide incentives for appropriate demand responses
in a retail market can have severe adverse effects on the performance of the wholesale
market that serves that retail market.
B. The Vocabulary of the Demand Response Debate
Participants in the demand response debate often use three terms that must be
understood to understand the debate—“locational marginal price,” “real-time pricing,”
and “negawatts.” Locational marginal price (LMP) is a term that incorporates by
reference an important characteristic of an electricity market. LMP recognizes that the
cost of making a unit of electricity available for purchase can vary greatly by location. 20
During some periods of time, the transmission grid is constrained to such an extent that it
can not support the combination of wholesale transactions that would yield the lowest
cost supply of electricity to a particular location (or node) on the grid. The size of the
transmission grid, coupled with the laws of physics, make the determination of LMP at
any node complicated and dynamic, but it is easy to illustrate the phenomenon by
assuming a simple grid with only two sources of electricity, 1 and 2, and two nodes, A
and B, from which retailers purchase electricity. 21 Assume that the MC of source 1 is 5
cents, while the MC of source 2 is 10 cents. If there is enough capacity on the grid to
allow electricity from source 1 to reach node A but not node B, the MC of electricity at
node A is 5 cents while the MC of electricity at node B is 10 cents. Since price equals
MC in a competitive market, it follows that the LMP at node A would be 5 cents and the
20

William Hogan, Electric Transmission: A New Model for Old Principles, The Electricity Journal, vol. 6,
no. 2, p.18 (1993).
21
For a more realistic and more complicated illustration, see id. at 20-22.

6

LMP at node B would be 10 cents in a competitive wholesale market that is supported by
a transmission grid with those characteristics. Thus, it is useful to refer to LMP as the
equivalent of MC in a wholesale electricity market. Since the MC of electricity often
varies significantly by location, we can be confident of getting an appropriate demand
response to changes in market conditions only if we allow the price of electricity to vary
by location.
Real-time pricing is a term that reflects another important characteristic of
electricity markets. The MC of electricity varies greatly over time. 22 That follows from
three characteristics of the market. First, the marginal cost of generating electricity varies
greatly among generating units—from about 1 cent per kilowatt hour (KWH) to about 20
cents per KWH. Second, demand for electricity varies greatly over time—demand at 3
p.m. on a hot tuesday in august can be many times greater than demand at 3 a.m. on a
balmy sunday in october. Third, electricity can not be economically stored. It must be
consumed at the same time it is produced. Thus, it is useful to refer to real-time prices as
synonymous with electricity prices based on MC. Since the MC of electricity varies
significantly over time, we can be confident of getting an appropriate demand response to
changes in market conditions only if we allow prices to vary significantly over time—
real-time pricing. 23
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Negawatt is a term that is sometimes used to refer to the economic equivalence of
a unit of electricity saved and a unit consumed. 24 Participants in the demand response
debate often assert that, since a negawatt is equivalent to a megawatt, it follows that
someone who produces a negawatt should be rewarded in a manner equivalent to
someone who produces a megawatt. That is true but the equation of negawatts and
megawatts is also potentially misleading. Any consumer that forgoes purchase and
consumption of a unit of electricity should be rewarded in an amount equal to the MC of
the unit it declines to purchase, but any consumer that purchases electricity in a
competitive market automatically receives exactly that reward in the form of a reduction
in its cost of electricity. Thus, for instance, if the MC of a unit of electricity is 8 cents,
and the consumer declines to purchase a unit at a price of 8 cents, the consumer receives
a reward of 8 cents. That reward is equal to the cost society avoids as a result of the
decision not to produce that unit of electricity. 25
If the consumer is also rewarded by receiving a price of 8 cents per unit for
producing a “negawatt,” as some of the participants in the demand response debate urge,
the consumer is rewarded at a total price equal to twice the MC of the unit of electricity it
consumes. 26 The consumer both saves 8 cents and receives 8 cents. Thus, a system of
pricing negawatts as if they are megawatts is premised on a math error that no first grader
should make. 8 cents plus 8 cents is not 8 cents.
I have long been puzzled by the apparent inability of many smart people to
understand that compensating some entity for producing a “negawatt” is inappropriate
24
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and involves simple double counting. I suspect that this common error is attributable to
the tendency of many people to focus only on the cost of electricity. It is certainly true
that consumption of electricity imposes social costs, but the same is true of any other
good or service. Consider the market for books, for instance. Books are made primarily
of paper. Production of paper imposes significant social costs, as anyone who has
knowledge of timbering and of the pulp and paper business well knows. Yet, an argument
that we should treat producers of negabooks the same way we treat producers of books
would not resonate with most audiences. I could not make much money trying to sell
negabooks by claiming that they have the same value as books. When most people think
of books, they initially think of their value to society rather than their cost to society. But,
of course, negawatts also have value. Thus, for instance, I could not create this word file
on my computer in my nicely lit office if it were not for megawatts.
Once you recognize that electricity is just like books, or any other product or
service, it is easy to see why the argument that a negawatt producer should be rewarded
in the same manner as a megawatt producer makes no sense. Like books, electricity is a
good that can only be produced and consumed by incurring costs. Our goal in creating a
properly functioning market for either electricity or books should be to implement a
pricing system in which price equals MC. 27 If we accomplish that goal, a “producer” of
negawatts or negabooks will be rewarded, in its capacity as a consumer, at an appropriate
level, in the form of a cost saving equal to the value of the resources not used, every time
it declines to purchase a unit of electricity or a book.
C. Jurisdictional Complications

27
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FERC has jurisdiction over wholesale electricity markets. It has been attempting
to create competitive wholesale markets for twenty years. 28 It has not yet enjoyed
complete success in that endeavor but it has the ability to address any remaining
impediments to creation of competitive wholesale markets in every region 29 and, it is
continuing to move in that direction. 30 As discussed in section A, a competitive market
automatically provides appropriate incentives for demand response. 31
Retail markets and wholesale markets are closely related in the context of demand
response, however. 32 A retail market that creates inappropriate incentives for demand
response can have adverse effects on the performance of a wholesale market, and vice
versa. Unfortunately, the US allocates authority over the wholesale electricity market to
one entity, FERC, and authority over retail electricity markets to fifty other entities, state
PUCs. My description of the critical role played by the decision of California authorities
to impose a retail price freeze in 2000 illustrates the potential for states to make decisions
applicable to retail markets that have devastating effects on the performance of a FERCregulated wholesale market. 33
Fortunately, states rarely make decisions at the retail level that have such
catastrophic effects on the performance of a wholesale market as did the California retail
rate freeze decision of 2000. States have been reluctant, however, to implement retail
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regulatory regimes that yield optimal incentives for demand response by equating retail
prices with MC. 34 The Department of Energy (DOE) has been urging states to implement
real-time pricing. One obstacle is the high cost of the smart meters that are a prerequisite
to implementation of real-time pricing. DOE has attempted to overcome that obstacle by
providing grants to some states to subsidize programs to install smart meters. 35 Even with
strong encouragement and partial funding from DOE, however, states have resisted
federal efforts to persuade them to adopt real-time pricing. State consumer advocates and
PUCs object to real-time pricing based in part of privacy concerns and in part on
concerns that low income and elderly consumers will pay higher electricity bills as a
result of their limited ability to shift their consumption from periods in which electricity
is expensive to periods in which it is inexpensive. 36
Real-time pricing would create appropriate incentives for demand response by
confronting consumers with the reality that electricity costs much more per unit at times
of peak demand than at times of slack demand. Studies have found that real-time pricing
can reduce the total cost of electricity by about 12% by inducing consumers to reduce
their demand at times of peak demand and to increase their demand at times of slack
demand. 37 The resulting reduction in peak demand would allow total demand for
electricity to be met with less generating capacity and, hence, at lower social cost. 38 Most
consumers would benefit from real-time pricing because most would switch enough of
their demand from high-priced periods of peak demand to low-priced periods of slack
34

The complicated debate with respect to implementation of real time pricing is discussed in detail in the
sources cited in note 23 supra.
35
DOE, Energy Secretary Chu Announces Five Million Smart Meters Installed Nationwide as Part of Grid
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demand to realize large reductions in their total cost of electricity. 39 Unless consumer
advocates and/or state PUCs change their attitudes, however, retail electricity prices will
continue to be based on average cost instead of marginal cost. 40
FERC has little ability to overcome the unfortunate reluctance of PUCs to adopt
retail regulatory systems that provide optimum incentives for demand responses to
changes in market conditions. FERC can, and should, take that reluctance into account in
choosing and implementing a system of wholesale pricing that incorporates appropriate
incentives for demand response. The unwillingness of state PUCs to implement real-time
pricing creates a pricing pattern in which the retail price of electricity is well below MC
during times of peak demand but in which the retail price exceeds MC at times of slack
demand. This pattern of prices has the potential to distort the proper functioning of the
wholesale market in one recurring situation—when a retail customer would be willing to
reduce its demand if it confronted appropriate incentives but it is not willing to do so
given the distorted incentives created by the absence of MC-based retail prices.
To illustrate this situation, imagine a large industrial or commercial consumer that
would reduce its demand during periods of peak demand by 20% if it confronted an MCbased real-time price of 40 cents per kwh but that is not willing to reduce its demand
during peak periods at the actual retail price it pays of 8 cents per kwh. Both the retail
market and the wholesale market would perform better if the consumer could obtain a
“reward” of 40 cents per kwh, rather than 8 cents per kwh, for reducing its demand by 20
per cent during periods of peak demand. FERC could address this problem effectively by
implementing a pricing system in which such a retail customer is “rewarded” at the
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wholesale level by receiving a price of 32 cents, the 40 cent MC of the units minus the
amount of money (8 cents) the customer saves for each unit it declines to purchase during
periods of peak demand. This method of pricing demand response is often referred to as
LMP-G, where LMP is the marginal cost of making the unit of electricity available at the
particular time and place at which the consumer receives delivery and where G is the
retail price per unit the consumer would pay if it were to purchase the units it is willing to
forego. 41
Note that this mechanism automatically incorporates the high temporal and
locational variability of the MC of electricity coupled with the unwillingness of most
PUCs to reflect those variables in retail rates. Thus, for instance, the same consumer
would not receive any extra “reward” in the form of payments from the wholesale
market, for reducing its demand during periods of slack demand. During such periods,
retail rates typically exceed MC. Thus for instance, if MC during a period of slack
demand is 5 cents, and the customer pays a retail price of 8 cents, it is already being
overcompensated by 3 cents per unit for reducing its demand during periods of slack
demand.
D. Complications Caused By Externalities
In section A, I explained why a competitive market automatically provides
appropriate incentives for demand response, 42 but I added a potentially important
qualification. A competitive market yields that salutary result only if marginal private
cost (MPC) equals, or at least approximates, marginal social cost (MSC). 43 If MSC
exceeds MPC by a significant amount, a competitive market will provide inadequate
41
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incentives for demand response. MSC exceeds MPC to the extent that there are social
costs associated with an activity that are not borne by the private market participants that
engage in the activity. 44 Government regulation requires electricity suppliers to
internalize most of the social costs of generating and transmitting electricity. 45 Thus, for
instance, electricity generators are required to implement elaborate and expensive
pollution control technologies to minimize the adverse effects of most of the potential
pollutants that are byproducts of the generation process.
There is one major exception to our use of regulation to require generators to
internalize the social cost of electricity generation, however. We do not regulate
effectively emissions of greenhouse gases. If you share my belief in the anthropogenic
global warming hypothesis, emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) attributable to use of
hydrocarbons to generate electricity is causing changes in the earth’s climate that have
the potential for catastrophic effects, including the death of millions of people and the
dislocation of hundreds of millions of people. 46 Given present technology, there is no
way of reducing the emissions of CO2 that are a byproduct of the use of hydrocarbons to
generate electricity.
Electricity generation accounts for 40 per cent of total US emissions of CO2.47
We use hydrocarbons to generate 70 per cent of our total electricity supply. 48 The MSC
of this part of our electricity supply is well above each generator’s MPC. The most
effective response to this problem would be to implement a form of government
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intervention that would require generators to internalize this social cost. Either a welldesigned cap and trade system or a large carbon tax would have that effect. 49 With the
social costs of climate change internalized to the private market participants that are
imposing that cost on society, my general assertion that competitive markets
automatically yield appropriate demand response incentives would continue to apply to
US electricity markets. So far, however, Congress has declined to adopt either a cap and
trade system or a carbon tax. In the absence of either of those measures, a competitive
electricity market will yield inadequate incentives for demand response. Thus, the
existence of large externalities could, in theory, justify implementing a system for
rewarding suppliers of demand response, i.e., consumers that reduce the quantity of
electricity they consume, in an amount in excess of the automatic reward they get in the
form of reduced electricity bills.
It would be very difficult, however, to design and to implement a demand
response program that would reflect that external cost in an acceptably accurate manner.
CO2 emissions from generating plants vary from zero for carbon-free generators like
nuclear power plants to a large number per unit of electricity for coal-powered plants. It
is hard to imagine how we could incorporate externalities into a demand response
program given that enormous variation in the magnitude of the externalities. Moreover,
some consumers might choose methods of reducing their demand for electricity from the
regulated wholesale electricity market that impose external social costs equal to, or in
excess of, the external costs of providing electricity from the grid. Thus, for instance,
some large industrial consumers might choose to use coal to generate their own
electricity supplies. Any attempt to incorporate recognition of external social costs in a
49
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demand response programs would have to account for both the high variability of the
external social costs of electricity obtained from the regulated market and for the
potential high external social costs of the measures consumers take to reduce their
purchases from the market. It is not clear that any such system can be designed or
implemented.
E. The Applicable Legal Principles
Any method of attempting to improve on the demand response incentives of
participants in wholesale electricity markets must be consistent with the requirement in
the Federal Power Act that all rates must be “just, reasonable, and not unduly
discriminatory.” 50 The just and reasonable standard has existed in a variety of contexts
for well over a century. Until 1944, courts believed that this statutory language required
agencies to employ a particular methodology in setting rates. 51 That judicial attitude
changed when the Supreme Court issued its 1944 opinion in Federal Power Commission
v. Hope Natural Gas Co. 52 In that opinion the Court announced that, henceforth, it was
the “end result” of the ratemaking process, rather than the methodology used, that
determined the legality of the agency decision. Hope freed agencies to use a variety of
ratemaking methods, but courts continued to believe that the just and reasonable standard
had a discrete substantive content that a court could identify and enforce in reviewing
agency ratemaking decisions. That judicial attitude changed when the Supreme Court
issued its 1968 opinion in Permian Basin Rate Cases. 53 In that opinion, the Court
announced that a court must uphold an agency’s decision to authorize particular rates if

50
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the rates fall within a “zone of reasonableness.” The Hope and Permian Basin decisions
reflected judicial recognition of some of the realities of the ratemaking process: it is as
much art as science; both the factual predicates for a ratemaking decision and the effects
of the rates set are subject to a large range of uncertainty; and, agencies must make
compromises among competing goals when they set rates. 54
After 1968, the tests courts applied in ratemaking cases gradually became a subset
of the general test courts apply to other agency actions—a court must uphold an agency
action as long as it is reasonable. 55 That general test, in turn, has three components: (1)
the agency decision must be based on a reasonable interpretation of the applicable
statute; 56 (2) the factual predicates for the agency action must be supported by “such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion;” 57 and (3) the agency must provide adequate reasons to explain each of the
steps it took in its decisionmaking process. 58
In the context of ratemaking through application of the just and reasonable
statutory standard, the first two components of the reasonableness inquiry rarely present a
problem for an agency. When a court rejects a ratemaking decision it usually does so by
concluding that the agency action was arbitrary and capricious because of one or more
flaws or gaps that the court detected in the agency’s reasoning process. Courts reject
about 30 per cent of agency actions on that basis. 59 Even when a court rejects an agency
action as arbitrary and capricious, however, about half of the time the court allows the
54
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agency action to remain in effect in anticipation that the agency will be able to sustain the
action on remand by correcting any gaps or flaws the court detected in the agency’s
reasoning process. 60
F. FERC Order 745
It is always difficult to predict the results of judicial review of an agency action.
The duty to provide adequate reasons for a decision is sufficiently malleable to yield
different results depending on the entering attitudes of the judges who engage in the
review process. 61 I believe it is likely, however, that a reviewing court will uphold FERC
Order 745. If I were a member of the circuit court panel that was given responsibility to
review that Order, I would vote to uphold the action through application of the basic
principles of law and economics applicable to the ratemaking process.
In Order 745, FERC rejected the LMP-G method of determining the per unit
payment a provider of demand response should receive. 62 FERC ordered the Regional
Transmission Organizations (RTOs) and Independent Service Operators (ISOs) that
operate each of the regional transmission grids to design and implement a system of
compensation that has the potential to compensate a provider of demand response at
LMP. 63 FERC added an important qualification to that requirement, however. A provider
of demand response is entitled to receive compensation based on LMP only in
circumstances in which payment of compensation based on LMP would satisfy a net
benefits test. FERC instructed RTOs and ISOs to identify the hours in which payment of
LMP provides net benefits to consumers by determining “when reductions in LMP from
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implementing demand response results in a reduction in the total amount consumers pay
for resources that is greater than the money spent acquiring those demand response
resources at LMP.” 64 That will be the case only when the unit of generation that is
avoided as a result of the demand response payment is so much more expensive than the
cost of the demand response unit that the decrease in LMP multiplied by the remaining
load would be greater than the cost of the demand response unit. 65
If I had been a member of FERC at the time it issued Order 745, I would have
joined Commissioner Moeller’s dissenting opinion. 66 I agree with him that: (1) LMP
rarely if ever is the correct measure of compensation for a unit of demand response; 67 (2)
LMP-G is the correct measure in most circumstances; 68 and, (3) the net benefits test
requires RTOs and ISOs to make a complicated and burdensome calculation that would
not be needed if FERC had adopted the LMP-G measure of compensation. 69
If I were instead a member of the circuit court panel that is assigned to review
Order 745, however, I would uphold the Order on the basis that FERC provided
reasoning adequate to support each step in its decisionmaking process. FERC rejected the
LMP-G measure of compensation based in part on its belief that it “would result in an
administrative burden of tracking retail rates for the multiple utilities, ESCOs and power
authorities and create undue confusion for retail customers and administrative difficulties
for state commissions and ISOs and RTOs.” 70 I agree with Commissioner Moeller that
the process of making the net benefits calculation is likely to be more confusing and
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burdensome than the process of applying LMP-G, but I can not say that the
Commission’s contrary belief is unreasonable.
My strong belief that LMP is almost always the wrong measure to use to
compensate providers of demand response is tempered by the Commission’s adoption of
a net benefits test that I suspect will allow for compensation based on LMP only in rare
cases in which LMP is not much above the appropriate level of compensation. Moreover,
FERC recognized and addressed explicitly the many ancillary concerns that surround any
effort to provide compensation for demand response beyond the level provided by the
market, e.g., it recognized the need to establish a reliable means of calculating and
verifying the quantity of the demand response claimed by a customer that seeks
compensation for a demand response. 71
Conclusion
I hope that we will reach the point at which there is no justification for adoption
of any method of compensating demand response through means other than those
provided automatically by the market for electricity. The conditions needed to reach that
point are: (1) creation of a competitive wholesale market for electricity in every region;
(2) implementation of a carbon tax or other means of increasing the price of consumption
of hydrocarbons to the point at which the MSC of generating electricity approximates the
MPC of generating electricity; and, (3) adoption of real time MC-based rates in all retail
markets. Since we are well short of those conditions at present, I believe that FERC
Order 745 offers the prospect of some marginal improvement in the performance of US
electricity markets.
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